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Education in the Muslim world today is shaped in part by a history of modern contentions and 
debates around the respective definitions, values and roles of “secular” and “religious” 
knowledge. Theories of modernization make economic and political development contingent on 
the expansion of secular education and the corresponding reform and/or marginalization of 
religious education.  In the 20th century, secular mass education has developed at a rapid rate in 
Muslim majority countries as part of socio economic development projects, albeit at different 
rhythms and through a diversity of national systems of education. Under the regulating power of 
the modern state, these national systems have developed compulsory primary and secondary 
education that has improved literacy rates for boys and girls, although disparities between 
countries can remain wide (Afghanistan vs. Tunisia for instance) and gender differences remain 
	  significant in most countries. In general, these systems have provided massive access to 
education, not only at the level of primary and secondary education, but also at the university 
level.   
 
Up until the last decade of the 20th century, there has been a tendency to analyze the evolution of 
educational systems in the Muslim world in terms of the diminishing importance of religious 
education. However, a recent renewal of scholarly interest has shown that religious education 
has remained significant and has in many cases thrived, in both the public and private sectors. 
Religious education in contemporary Muslim majority countries takes a variety of forms: from 
the traditional madrasas (literally: “place of study”), also called the ḥawza ‘ilmiyya (an 
“enclosure” devoted to knowledge, or a community of knowledge) in the Shi‘i context, to the 
religious education imparted in private or public schools within an otherwise secular 
curriculum, and to the one-on-one teaching relationship between master and disciple in tarīqas 
(mystical structures of authority and worship). The respective roles of secular and religious 
education in Muslim majority societies, as well as their interaction, depend on these societies’ 
specific histories of nation building. Internal debates concerning education are usually 
embedded in discussions about national identity and religion. In particular, the place that Islam 
as a scriptural tradition and a set of sentiments and embodied practices plays in the institutions 
of education must be understood in combination with an examination of the extent and forms of 
regulation of education by state authorities.  
 
The chapter will show that western influences and colonization, together with state regulation of 
education, produced new forms of knowledge deemed more essential and efficient for social and 
economic development. These new forms of knowledge deeply transformed the modes of 
transmission of religious knowledge and the relationship between education and religion.   
 
To better understand these dynamics in the contemporary Muslim world, one must first 
understand the general patterns of education in pre modern times. After a brief review of pre 
modern education, the chapter will examine how modern conceptions and practices of “religious 
education” evolved in the 19th and 20th centuries alongside the development of secular mass 
education, which  encroached upon older forms of transmission of knowledge centered on the 
Islamic tradition. The sheer diversity and number of cases that have been treated in the 
secondary literature does not allow for a comprehensive review. Therefore, the author of this 
	  chapter has made the choice of concentrating on a few cases and favoring comparisons and 
conceptualization over a comprehensive treatment of the subject. 
 
 
The Notion of Education in the Islamic tradition: the Pre-modern Context 
 
The Islamic tradition gives a central role to knowledge, or ‘ilm in Arabic, and with it the one who 
searches for knowledge (ṭālib al-‘ilm) as well as those who possess knowledge and disseminate 
it:  the scholars (‘ulamā or “those who know”). As Franz Rosenthal wrote: “… ‘ilm is one of those 
concepts that have dominated Islam and given Muslim civilization its distinctive shape and 
complexion. In fact, there is no other concept that has been operative as a determinant of 
Muslim civilization in all its aspects to the same extent as ‘ilm.” (Rosenthal, 2007:2)  The 
categories of learning (ta‘allum) and teaching (ta‘līm) are crucial parts of the conceptualization 
of Islamic knowledge, be it the knowledge of God, the afterlife (ākhira) or this life (dunyā). The 
search for knowledge and its transmission are often said to be related to the discovery or 
deepening of one’s faith, and studying is considered a form of worship. In the Koran, God is the 
all knowing (‘alīm), and true knowledge of the worlds seen and unseen is the primary knowledge 
that God has. However, numerous hadiths underline the value that knowledge holds for humans 
as well, and describe the search for knowledge as a duty that  produces rewards both in this life 
and in the hereafter. One should seek knowledge as far as China, to paraphrase a well known 
hadith. The ‘ulamā hold a high status, and are often described as the inheritors of the prophets 
(warathat al-anbiyā’).  
 
In his Fātiḥat al-‘ulūm, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d.1111), who reflected in diverse ways on 
questions of pedagogies and education, describes knowledge as a truly human endeavor, as an 
art and a profession (ṣinā‘a) that can be classified according to the types of knowledge: what is 
known from the prophecy, what is known through reason (arithmetics), experimentation 
(medicine), or hearing (language); knowledge is also classified through a hierarchy of moral 
intentions and their inter-relations. While the higher forms of knowledge were the domain of a 
small literate elite in pre modern Muslim societies, “knowledge of practices and action” (‘ilm 
mu‘āmalāt) was incumbent upon each individual Muslim as a set of guidelines for virtuous  
behavior. The highest forms of learning in medieval times were that of the Koranic text, the  
study of hadiths,  and the study of the law, in particular through the concept of fiqh, which refers 
	  to the process of “understanding” (faqaha) and to the set of juridical instantiations of the sharia 
(Berkey 1992).  
 
These different kinds of knowledge are closely interrelated, but developed at different times as 
institutionalized pedagogical domains. In particular, the development of the madrasa in the 11th 
century became institutionalized as the science of law became a central intellectual endeavor. 
George Makdisi distinguishes between three periods of development of institutions of learning, 
from the mosque to the madrasa. The madrasa was “the institution of learning par excellence,”  
since it was devoted primarily to the study of Islamic law, queen of the Islamic sciences” 
(Makdisi 1981: 9). As early as prophetic times, the learning circle (the ḥalaqa) in mosques was 
the locus for transmission of knowledge, and the kuttāb (the place of writing) developed in the 
first century of Islam as the place where elementary instruction was dispensed, often in a space 
adjacent to the mosque (Kadi 2006: 313). The emergence of the mosque-hostel-college took 
place later, between the 10th and the 11th century, “at least a hundred years before their Western 
counterparts, the European universities.” (Mottahedeh 1985 :89) They taught Islamic sciences –
which were intended to foster the study of Islamic religious law- through a professional body of 
teachers, and were equipped with a structure for lodging their students. Their styles of teaching 
and contents have always been diverse and related to their context, as well as to interpretive 
traditions. For instance, the identity of the Shi‘i ḥawza is grounded in the disputatio. Madrasas 
and ḥawza-s were most of the time sustained by a waqf deed and therefore by individual or 
family patronage that could also be linked to the world of politics. Sultans, vizirs and powerful 
elites as well as wealthy benefactors founded madrasas. Among them were some women, as in 
the case of the foundation of the Qarawiyyin of Fez in Morocco in 859 by Fatima al-Fihri, the 
educated daughter of a wealthy merchant. The madrasa was a central institution that mirrored 
the power of  its founders through the reputation of its teachers and scholars, its architecture, its 
library, and all other elements that formed this institutional complex. Because deeds of 
endowments allowed  the  founders to specify the domains of instruction, the curricula of 
madrasas could vary. There was, however, a definite focus on the Islamic sciences. Other types 
of knowledge, such as Greek works, circulated in private homes and libraries or in the case of 
medical knowledge, in hospitals. In general, pre-modern Islamicate civilizations “made room for 
the efflorescence of the secular in the midst of the religious.” (Kadi 2006: 312). However, the 
division between sciences was not rigid and did not reflect the existence of two entirely 
autonomous and separate worlds, the religious and the secular. For instance, philosophy could 
	  be taught by some ulama under the rubric of hadith, as well as outside of the official curriculum 
(Makdisi 1981: 77-80).  
 
These places for the transmission of knowledge catered to an elite of educated men, and more 
rarely women, and had different outlooks depending on the place and time. Jonathan Berkey 
has documented the extraordinary vitality of Muslim education in medieval Cairo and showed 
that Muslim education was as much an “informal affair” and a “dynamic network” as it was an 
institutional endeavor (Berkey 1992: 17, 20). Interpersonal instruction played a crucial role, in 
particular through the master-disciple relationship and the delivery of the ijāza, the written 
document that the master issued to his student to certify that he had transmitted to the student 
a number of prophetic traditions or that the student had studied a certain number of works 
under his tutelage.  
 
 
The Rupture of Modern Times: The Distinction Between Secular and Religious 
Knowledge  
 
In modern times, factors such as western influence, direct occupation by foreign nation-states, 
or projects of broad social reform sustained by indigeneous elites led to an institutionalized 
dichotomy between religious and secular knowledge. It became an objectified division, which  
was sustained by the birth of the new systems of education that gave priority to “modern 
sciences” (al-‘ulūm al-ḥadītha) over religious knowledge. This new polarity led to tensions 
between traditional elites who taught in madrasas and  representatives of the new educational 
institutions inspired by western models. These tensions unsettled the authority and legitimacy 
of the traditional carriers of knowledge, and translated at the moral, social and political levels. 
Under the pressure of European colonialism and under the influences of Western cultures, the 
existing networks of transmission of knowledge underwent a deep transformation that many 
historians have analyzed as a general decline of Islamic education, leading to its marginalization 
relative to newly emerging institutions of secular knowledge (Keddie 1972, Sayyid-Marsot 1972, 
Delanoue 1982). This process of marginalization is well documented, but more historical 
research would need to be done to understand the effects of the encroachment of secular 
education upon madrasa education on previous conceptions of knowledge and pedagogy. 19th 
century educators and intellectuals produced new narratives on education and underlined the 
need to reform it. Their diagnosis was that religious education was in decline and was becoming 
	  archaic in the context of the sweeping changes taking place in their societies. However, too 
much attention given to this paradigm of decline has obscured the transformations that took 
place more deeply in the epistemology of religious learning. The reformers’ diagnosis disparaged 
what they evaluated as archaic methods in religious education and the incompetence they saw in 
most of the madrasa teachers (Hourani 1962). This added to the critiques articulated by 
representatives of the colonizing powers, and produced an extremely negative picture of the 
state of the madrasas that had also declined economically by the end of the 18th century and the 
early 19th century.  
 
 
Reforming Education: Bringing Islam into the World 
 
The modern reformers saw educational institutions as a channel to revitalize Islam within their 
broader projects of social and political reforms. Education was often crucial in reformist 
ideologies, because it was conceived as a pivotal instrument for change. As part of a project to 
revitalize and strengthen Islam by making it more relevant, reforms of the old madrasa system 
showed a desire to bring the sciences of religion (‘ulūm al-dīn) closer to this world (al-dunyā) 
and to life (al-ḥayāt).  Reform was  meant to preserve Islamic education from decline, but not 
necessarily by isolating it from the influences of modern knowledge. Rather, since the aim was 
to  endow religious knowledge with a new relevance for Muslims, reform had to make religious 
knowledge useful for life in this world, not only as correct practice, but also as sustaining 
knowledge of the secular world. This project of integrating religious knowledge with 
contemporary life implicated a transformation of the place of this knowledge in the general 
structures of teaching and learning and new conceptions of its transmission. 
 
These reformist projects took different forms depending on the context. In India, for instance, 
where Muslims formed a minority, reformist ulama established new schools, such as the Farangi 
Mahall in Lucknow, in order to remedy the loss of patronage that came with the end of the 
Moghol Empire, and to preserve an Islamic heritage threatened by imperial assaults from the 
West. Schooling was based on the Dars I Nizami, a systematized curriculum that combined 
Arabic grammar, logic, philosophy, mathematics, rhetoric, fiqh and theology, and more 
marginally Koran and hadith (Metcalf 2005: 31). The British also established educational 
institutions, which combined features of the Muslim and British education systems, such as the 
Delhi College in 1825: there were an “English” track and an “Oriental” track, in which sciences 
	  were taught in Urdu. The Delhi College became the model on which the ulama later rebuilt their 
institutions of learning, clearly inspiring the structures of the modern madrasa. Barbara 
Metcalf’s study of the Indian madrasas underlines a depoliticization of the ulama after  the 
mutiny of 1857 and their shift toward a focus on internal reform and education projects. In 
particular, the establishment of the school of Deoband in 1867, financed by the public rather 
than by the rulers or the system of waqfs, provided a structured institution of education 
independent from the state and from the waqf system, that re appropriated the Dars I Nizami 
with a special focus on hadith, in order to train future reformers. Standardized examinations, a 
library, and a physical separation from the mosque made this new structure self sufficient, 
explicitly institutionalizing education in a Muslim school that could efficiently cater to high 
numbers of students coming from all over the country.  
 
A reverse process took place in the Ottoman state and its provinces in the 19th century. Whereas 
in India reforms of education sprung from the loss of state patronage, in Ottoman societies 
reform came from state-sponsored tanzimat, reflecting the new regulatory power of the modern 
state and announcing its authoritarian policies vis-à-vis education in general and  religious 
education in particular. 
 
During the 19th century, modern schools were established in the Ottoman provinces roughly 
following  the model of the tanzimat. In general, these reforms were carried out by state 
authorities. These states were aiming to modernize their own administrations and produce new 
kinds of bureaucrats, as well as well trained officers for their armies.  They implemented reforms 
outside of the traditional system of education by circumventing it, which led to a dichotomy 
between the traditional and modern systems of education. In Egypt, Khedive Muhammad Ali 
(1805-1849) and his successors opened up schools on the Western model. Schools training 
officers  began opening in 1816, and a medical school was established in 1826. These schools 
contrasted with al-Azhar in both the form and the content of the knowledge transmitted. The 
new schools had a standardized curriculum and system of evaluation, organized according to the 
principles of western pedagogies and disciplines (Mitchell 1991), whereas al-Azhar’s teaching 
did not. Al-Azhar's classes were not organized by age, often took place inside the mosque or in 
the teacher’s home, and were not based on a standardized curriculum. Rote learning and 
memorization were the most frequently used methods of learning, and the modern subjects 
taught in the new schools were often absent from the body of knowledge transmitted at al-
Azhar. This contrast informed the diagnosis made by 19th and 20th century Egyptian reformers 
	  who criticized the state of studies in institutions such as al-Azhar. This narrative was built on the 
comparison of the traditional and modern systems and based on the new dichotomy that 
separated schools for modern knowledge (‘ulūm ‘aṣriyya or ḥadītha) and schools for religious 
knowledge. However, in the language of the reformers, this “modern” knowledge was not 
necessarily dubbed “secular,” or “a-religious,” but rather understood as “new” or belonging to 
the present times. It is also worth underlining that this separation was not so clear cut in 
practice. Schools that disseminated scientific knowledge often recruited their students from the 
kuttabs and from al-Azhar, which necessitated the recruitment of translators to translate into 
Arabic the teaching offered by foreign instructors. “Middle range” schools were also established 
that took their subjects of instruction from both systems, such as Dar al-Ulum in Cairo, created 
in 1872, and the Sadiki collège, created in 1875 in Tunis (Sraieb 1995). These middle range 
institutions transmitted religious knowledge, but in a way that explicitly differed from al-Azhar 
or the Zaytuna, even though they often recruited faculty from these traditional institutions. They 
taught a wider range of subjects than the traditional madrasas, from literature, history, and 
geography to sciences and foreign languages, and competed with al-Azhar and the Zaytuna in 
terms of quality of instruction, range of topics covered, and job opportunities for their 
graduates. State-imposed reforms of  al-Azhar in the last quarter of the 19th century therefore 
aimed at reorganizing its administration and at clearly defining the status of the teaching body 
to bring it on par with modern institutions. New subjects were also introduced at al-Azhar 
between the end of the 19th century and the early 20th century, such as algebra, geography and 
history.  
 
 
The Crucial Role of Religious Education in the Wider Reforms of Education 
 
It was in this context that in 1895, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), a graduate of and former 
teacher at al-Azhar, was given the task of reforming education at the largest institution of 
education in Egypt at that time. Al-Azhar offered education from the elementary level of the 
kuttāb to the highest degree, the ‘ālimiyya, which made its holder a scholar (‘ālim).  His 
proposals for reform were often resented by his more conservative colleagues who accused him 
of wanting to transform al-Azhar into “a school of philosophy and literary education that fights 
religion and wants to extinguish its light” (Von Kukelgen 2011). Abduh articulated a harsh 
critique of the ulama and of the curriculum at al-Azhar. In particular, he denounced the rigidity 
(jumūd) of the ulama  as well as their aversion for “the contemporary sciences” (al-‘ulūm al-
	  ‘asriyya): “they gather their intellectual forces in order to focus on well known studies and 
ignore anything else to the point that it seems that they do not belong to this century and even 
worse: they do not belong to this world (laysū min hādhihi al-dunyā) (Rida, 1906-1931, vol. 1: 
411). While Abduh and other reformers severely criticized the methods of learning at al-Azhar 
and in particular the refusal of the ulama to engage with the modern sciences, they did not 
reflect on the fact that the conservative ulama’s position against reform was also related to the 
ulama's self-understanding as guardians of the Islamic tradition –a tradition which they 
perceived as threatened by modernization. They felt that engaging with the “contemporary 
sciences” carried the risk of marginalizing the tradition they were supposed to maintain and 
transmit.  
 
This did not mean that Abduh and like-minded reformers were against the existence of religious 
education, but rather that they wanted to reform it in a way that would integrate all sciences, 
secular and religious, in order to maximize the benefits of education for Muslim students. For 
Abudh, this reform of education –in which religious instruction was central – was the channel 
through which society would be transformed and improved. Islam had to play a pivotal role in 
this reform. In a programmatic text dealing with the Nizamiyya primary and secondary schools 
in the Ottoman state, Abduh underlined that ignorance and immorality were tightly linked 
(Rida, 1906-1931, vol. 2: 505). In particular, he related what he saw as the catastrophic state of 
the Nizamiyya schools to the absence of religious education (ta‘līm dīnī) and insisted on Quran 
education to be integrated in the curriculum: “the qur’ān is the secret of the success of 
Muslims.” (Rida, 1906-1931, vol. 1, 414). In the same vein, he explained desertions in the army 
by the absence of religious education in military schools (Rida, 1906-1931, vol. 1: 415). The 
reformist narratives hence developed a project of mutual integration of religious and secular 
education, lamenting their isolation in separate domains. For Abduh, religious instruction 
(tarbiya or ta‘līm) was the basis of all education. If used as a foundation it would strengthen 
morality and favor reasoning, leading to the next phases of instruction in modern scientific 
knowledge (Von Kukelgen 2011). Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida had great confidence in 
the power of education as a tool to shape their societies: “a reform of society (iṣlāḥ madanī) 
based on the Koran and the sunna” was what Muslim societies needed (Rida 1906-1931, Vol. 1: 
415). 
 
 
The Loss of Legitimacy and the Transformation of Islamic Education 
	   
Debates about the legitimacy and the methods of reform separated reformist ulama at al-Azhar 
from those who refused to change their ways of teaching. These debates were not merely 
ideological, opposing modern to traditional conceptions of education. An important part of the 
ulama resisted the reforms because they saw these modernizing projects as an assault on their 
own institutions, on their function of preserving the Islamic tradition and hence on their own 
authority. These debates were also related to economic questions, such as the growing 
precariousness of graduates of traditional institutions of learning on the job market. Between 
the two World Wars, madrasa graduates could no longer compete with their counterparts from 
the modern schools. They were no longer forming the intellectual and professional elite of 
Egyptian society. Also, the emergence of political movements on a massive scale in the 20th 
century, such as the Wafd Party or the Muslim Brothers, did place the effendis, the urban middle 
class that had little to do with the madrasa type of education, at the forefront of politics. The 
ulama were being relegated to the periphery of Egyptian society, marginalized not only by the  
growing centrality of novel types of education, but also by emerging social and political 
movements.  
 
It was in this context of a growing sense of marginalization among the ulama that the law of 1911 
regulated  the processes for application, examination, and granting of degrees at al-Azhar. The 
mode of transmission of knowledge became less individual. At al-Azhar in the first part of the 
20th century, primary and secondary institutes, the ma‘had-s, started to replace the kuttabs, 
where children used to learn in a circle sitting on the floor, often in the mosque or in the house 
of the master. The institutes copied the school in its modern form, with chairs, tables, and a 
blackboard, in a building expressly designated for education. At the higher education level, three 
domains of learning were compartmentalized in different schools (kulliyāt): Arabic Language, 
Sharia Law, Theology or “usūl al-dīn.” Al-Azhar progressively shifted to a modernized structure 
for the transmission of religious knowledge that severed its links to the sacred space of the 
mosque and introduced a new spatial order for teaching.  
 
While the forms of the madrasa and the modern university converged, the kuttabs never 
disappeared and the ḥalaqa (circle) as a form of transmission of knowledge did not cease to 
exist either. This speaks to the fact that while modernization transformed religious education in 
ways that somewhat severed  its relation with the madrasa tradition, it also led to a  diversity of 
forms of religious learning that persist to this day. In Egypt, North Africa or Lebanon (Mervin 
	  2000), to give only a few examples, the structures for the transmission of religious knowledge 
became diverse, from the kuttabs, to more formal primary and secondary religious schools (the 
madāris ‘atīqa in Morocco or the ma‘āhid azhariyya in Egypt), to higher levels of education 
that cater to informal ḥalaqāt in mosques, to dissemination of knowledge within mystical 
communities, or to the modern university – such as the universities of Cairo and Damascus, 
which include schools of sharia. The hawzas of Najaf in Iraq and Qum in Iran are crucial 
locations of production and dissemination of Shi‘i Islamic knowledge, and play a political and 
social role beyond the mere transmission of knowledge.  
 
 
The Transformation of Contents and the Expansion of Religious Education: A New 
Hybrid? 
 
The transformation of Islamic schooling in the 20th century was not only one of forms and 
structures. The content of the knowledge transmitted and its presentation to students were also 
radically reshaped. For instance, changes to the legal system during the 19th century instigated 
curricular transformations in the domain of sharia.  In the Arab world, the development of 
hybrid legal systems – based on European law but incorporating elements of the sharia –  
necessitated the training of lawyers and magistrates in Western positive law. New schools of law 
were created in the 19th century and the 20th century, such as the Khedive Ismail school of law in 
1868, the school of judges founded in Cairo in 1907, the Centres d’études juridiques founded by 
the French in Tunis in 1922 and in Rabat and Casablanca in 1927, or the school of law of Beirut 
in 1912. As described by Monique Cardinal (Cardinal 2005), they taught positive law (qānūn) 
alongside sharia law, which led to the teaching of sharia in radically new forms.   
 
In the new schools of law, the classical treatises and fiqh compendia  that used to inculcate legal 
knowledge in the traditional madrasa were  no longer required to be read in their entirety by the 
students. In the 20th century, new textbooks were written and published by scholars of sharia, 
themselves often graduates of traditional institutions, who specialized in teaching Islamic legal 
theory. These books mixed short excerpts from classical texts with concepts of positive law that 
became the framework for understanding legal theory. They also presented sharia in 
comparison with positive law, showing the possibility of a convergence between them (Cardinal 
2005). This strategy might have been an attempt  on the part of teachers of Islamic law to appeal  
to students in modern schools of law, as Cardinal has argued, but more fundamentally it was  an 
	  attempt to present the law in terms that kept its linkage with tradition in a context where 
Western law had become hegemonic – nearly the only system through which law was legible. 
This new framework offered concepts through which it became possible to construct law 
through a  narrative that made it markedly “Islamic.” This integration of classical texts in 
textbooks that referred centrally to the vocabulary of Western positive law led to the 
fragmentation and  marginalization of the classical tradition, as well as to a reinterpretation of 
sharia as “Islamic law”  in comparison to positive law, or qānūn. This new narrative about 
Islamic law echoed and converged with the contemporaneous emergence of a vocabulary of 
political Islam that  demanded the application of “Islamic law” and the foundation of an “Islamic 
state.”  
 
The fragmentation and  near-effacement of the classical legal treatises did not exclusively take 
place in the modern schools of law. It also happened in colleges of sharia within traditional 
institutions of religious education such as al-Azhar in Egypt, the Qarawiyyin in Morocco or the 
Zaytuna in Tunisia. For instance, after the reform of 1961 at al-Azhar, the college of sharia  
(kulliyyat al-sharī‘a) became the  college of “sharia  and positive law” (kulliyat al-sharī‘a wa’l-
qānūn) and modern textbooks introducing excerpts of the classical literature were used in the 
curriculum of the school.  
 
This combination of two references of unequal status – the texts of the Islamic tradition 
embedded in the Western paradigms of legal theory – did not only emerge as the product of  
pedagogical agendas produced in the new textbooks. It also originated from the projects devised 
by the newly independent Egyptian state that was attempting, with more or less success, to 
directly engage with and regulate religious knowledge, in order to control the potential political 
challenge from undomesticated religious authorities. The perfect illustration of this engagement 
with institutions of religious knowledge was the authoritarian reform of al-Azhar by Nasser’s 
regime in 1961: law number 103 of 1961 made al-Azhar part of the administration of the state, 
reconfigured its administrative structure, and, most importantly for this argument, reformed the 
types of knowledge transmitted at al-Azhar. As a mosque (jāmi‘ al-Azhar), al-Azhar also 
officially gained the status of university (jāmi‘at al-Azhar). This echoed the status of Cairo 
University, which had been established in 1908 as the first Egyptian university. At the level of 
the primary and secondary institutes of al-Azhar, the curriculum was built on religious subjects 
as well as on the secular subjects taught in the system of public education.  Young students 
acquired both types of knowledge and specialized afterwards in any of the schools of al-Azhar 
	  University. At the university level, the three schools remained (Sharia and Positive Law, Arabic 
language, and Theology), representing a “religious center,” and new schools teaching secular 
subjects – from medicine to pharmacy, languages to biology – were built in the suburbs of Cairo, 
as well as in the provinces. The project reflected earlier reformist desires to integrate religious 
and secular knowledge in a way that would revitalize Islam and lead to the general progress of 
society. In that narrative, echoing Abduh’s earlier observations about the isolation of the ulama 
from the world around them, the carriers of religious knowledge had to be brought back into the 
world. The aim of the 1961 reforms was therefore to bring together religion and this world (dīn 
wa dunyā), and to make the ulama and their knowledge “useful.” The narratives justifying the 
1961 reforms denied the ulama the status of “men of religion,” and insisted on the illegitimacy of 
a separation between the “science of religion” and the “science of this world,” arguing that 
religion could not be a “profession” (ḥirfa) (Zeghal 1996).  
 
This official narrative justifying the reform was deeply ambivalent, because it took a position 
defending “Islamic education” while at the same time diluting it with other subjects to preserve 
its relevance. The ulama understood this ambivalence very well. They resented such a 
representation, because it denied them their specialization in the tradition as a specific domain 
of teaching.  Indeed, the reforms radically reconfigured  the ulama as hybrids whose function 
was to bridge Islam and the world by becoming specialists of both domains. In fact, Nasser’s 
reform echoed the project of the Muslim Brothers by conjoining the two orders constituted by 
“religion” and the “world” (dīn wa dunyā).   
 
The most immediate practical result of this state-imposed reform of the early 1960s was to 
expand al-Azhar as a university. This was reflected in the increase of the number of students in 
the 1970s and 1980s, which in turn led to the proletarization of the university students.  A 
significant number of ulama who taught in the religious schools at the university hence 
expressed the desire to see al-Azhar recover its unique specialization in religion.  They 
complained that the expansion of their university through the addition of modern subjects had 
produced graduates who excel neither in the secular sciences nor in religious knowledge, and 
had strained the university’s resources (Zeghal 1996). The combination of religious and secular 
knowledge in various educational contexts also created a commonality of epistemological 
conditions and worldviews between graduates of public secular schools  and graduates of al-
Azhar,  since all students have access to a blend of secular and religious knowledge.  
 
	  Some scholars have argued that it was precisely this combination of religious and secular 
concepts in the context of mass education after the 1960s that led to the development of political 
Islam (Kepel 1985). While this assertion is difficult to verify, it is nonetheless important to 
underline that religious knowledge was not necessarily marginalized, but rather deeply 
transformed by its combination with secular knowledge. This combination helped sustain the 
claim by Islamist ideologues that all knowledge, and scientific knowledge in particular, could be 
attained through Islam, and that Islam could be the foundation of all domains of life. Deepening 
the idea that a combination of secular and religious knowledge led to ideologies of Islamism, 
Olivier Roy has argued that Islamist students were more represented in scientific departments 
in universities of the Muslim world in the last quarter of the 20th century than in other 
departments, precisely because they interpreted scientific knowledge as contained in the Islamic 
scriptures and verifiable through them (Roy 1990 and 1996).  The correlation between types of 
education and politicization are, however, difficult to verify: political Islam’s ideology seems to 
be as much present among the graduates of secular scientific education as it is among the 
graduates of religious education (Zeghal 1996).  
 
The desire to return to purer “religious roots” was often expressed by the ulama of al-Azhar –
and was even realized in part, when, within the Faculty of Islamic law and Positive Law, a 
program for the study of sharia was developed in the 1970s and a kulliyat al-da‘wa (school for 
the call to Islam) was established within the millenarian jāmi‘ in the old center of Cairo. This 
desire is not to be interpreted as the expression of “Islamism” within an institution such as al-
Azhar, but rather as a project to re center knowledge on the Islamic tradition, and to make it less 
affected by the pressures of having to conform to the rules and constraints of secular domains of 
knowledge. The projects to make al-Azhar conform more closely to the old madrasa system is 
also deeply linked to a desire for political independence from the state’s administration. Projects 
to create a “private al-Azhar” under the Mubarak regime have been attempted unsuccessfully by 
some faculty members since the 1970s (Zeghal 1996). The aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution might very well provide new opportunities to this enterprise of “liberation” of 
religious education from the grip of the state as well as from the constraints of secular “reform.”  
 
[IMAGE] 
 
State Reforms and the Marginalization of Islamic Education 
 
	  While the 1961 reform of al-Azhar was an attempt on the part of the Egyptian state to modernize  
and domesticate the university, it also paradoxically led to its expansion in terms of number of 
schools at all levels and in terms of number of students. This reflected the high demand of 
Egyptian families for religious education in the second part of the 20th century, as well as the use 
of al-Azhar by the government as a space in which to accommodate the overflow of high school 
graduates in search of a seat in a college. Al-Azhar's modern faculties in particular became the 
receptacle for lower performing high school graduates in the 1980s, leading to the 
transformation of al-Azhar into an institution for mass education.  
 
However, in the Arab Middle East, not all post-colonial reforms led to such an expansion of the 
religious education sector. In Morocco, the monarchy neglected its madrasas for a long time, 
leading to the weakening of the teaching institution of the Qarawiyin and the fragmentation of 
the networks of religious teaching into differentiated institutions (Eickelman 2007, Zeghal 
2008).  
 
In Tunisia, where state elites in the 1960s were strongly influenced by the Turkish model of 
secularism, state policies marginalized the traditional sector of education. The kuttabs were 
closed, along with  the University of Zaytuna and its annexes in the provinces. Of the Zaytuna, 
only a small faculty of theology remained, which was integrated within the newly opened 
University of Letters of Tunis in 1960. While religious education remained in the curriculum in 
primary and secondary public schools under the name “religious and civic education” (tarbiya 
dīniyya wa madaniyya), at the higher level it was shrunk to a specialization until the Zaytuna 
was reinstated as a university in 1989. After 1989, President Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime, 
faced with the expansion of the Islamist movement, undertook a radical reform of religious 
education. The textbooks for public schools were entirely rewritten under the authority of 
minister of Education Mohamed Charfi (Charfi 2009). The class of “religious and civic 
education” was divided into two separate classes: “religious education” and “civic education.” 
The former was revamped to teach the basics of the tradition, as well as to transmit a modernist 
interpretation of the religious texts, presented in short excerpts. The latter insisted on the 
rationalist interpretation of reformist Islam in combination with texts from the European 
Enlightenment, in particular from the French tradition, transmitting the values of freedom and 
democracy. These new textbooks contrasted with previous teachings, which were more morally 
and politically conservative in tone and content. Because they inculcated human rights and 
	  democratic values, they were also strongly at odds with the increasing authoritarianism of the 
regime.  
 
This textbook reform originated from the conviction on the part of the Ben Ali regime that 
Islamist ideologies posed a threat to the Tunisian state and society. The regime was particularly 
concerned that graduates of the Zaytuna, who had been teaching religious and civic education in 
secondary schools, and were allegedly immersed in Islamist ideologies, had thereby helped 
expand the reach of the Islamist movement in the younger generation (Zeghal 2009). It was on  
this basis that the Ministry of Education undertook to reduce the number of graduates from the 
Zaytuna after 1989, and to prevent them from teaching civic education, relegating them to 
teaching “religious education” only. This reform illustrates the power/knowledge nexus that is at 
play in any reform of educational institutions, showing how the state elites' understanding of 
political dangers can lead them to reform education in form and content. However, it is difficult 
to evaluate its effects on the evolution of Islamist movements in Tunisia.  
 
It can be argued, nonetheless, that the striking contrast between the content of the new 
textbooks and the political reality of Tunisia in the last two decades of the 20th century might 
shed significant light upon the revolutionary events of the winter 2010-2011 and the end of Ben 
Ali’s authoritarian regime. The youth who were at the forefront of the uprisings were  the very 
products of the educative reforms started by Ben Ali’s regime in 1989, which disseminated  
ideals of democracy and human rights.  During fieldwork in the summer of 2011 in Tunis,  I had 
a conversation with a civic education teacher in a secondary school in the suburbs of Tunis that 
illuminated the contrast between the textbooks and the political reality of authoritarianism. I 
asked her if and how she was able to teach the democratic values inscribed in the civic education 
textbooks to her students in the authoritarian context before the revolution. She answered: “In 
schools, the politics of oppression (qam‘) was rampant, even at the kindergarten level. Teachers 
would let the students speak about the texts, those texts about human rights, democracy, 
pluralism, etc., but would remain silent on them. The students would ask questions, but I would 
not respond. I knew there were also spies among the students. They would say, ‘The teacher is 
afraid. My father is silent. My grand father is silent.’ This oppression has transformed bodies 
and minds into deprived bodies and minds (maḥrūma). Hence, the revolution was a revolution 
of bodies, not of reasons. And this is different from the revolution for our independence [the 
1956 independence of Tunisia].” Her gripping analysis of the revolution and of her relationship 
with her young students reveals the tensions between a curriculum that expounded democratic 
	  values, and the political reality of authoritarianism. In this context, the desire for political 
change could not find a channel to express itself other than in the street. It expressed itself 
through street demonstrations that demanded the fall of the government, without articulating a 
new and clear political project. While the textbook reform had been praised for its “modern” 
contents (Béji 1997), it only had an effect “by default” – that is, by demonstrating the absence in 
everyday life of the principles these textbooks articulated.     
 
 
The Domestication of Islam and the Quest for Autonomy 
 
Gregory Starrett has shown how religious education in Egyptian public schools “functionalized 
Islam,” and how state reformers made education a channel for policies of social integration 
through Western sociological ideologies of progress. Islam was hence transformed from a set of 
practices to a set of values that promoted good citizenship and discipline (Starrett 1998). As in 
Tunisia, religious education was harnessed by the Egyptian state as a channel for moral 
indoctrination in its fight against political Islam. Contrary to the Tunisian case, the Egyptian 
state’s strategy actually reinforced the Islamic “trend” in a context where printed and new media 
also deployed more content devoted to Islam in the last quarter of the 20th century. Within the 
secular structure of public education, Islam gained a new objectified form that made it  an 
attainable  object that could be implemented in different domains. It was particularly legible as a 
political resource, as articulated by the slogan “Islam is the solution” (al-islām huwwa al-ḥall). 
This might be why the Egyptian state introduced a civic and moral program in the public school 
curriculum in 2001-2002,  separating religious from civic education as had been done in Tunisia 
in order to make Islam less “comprehensive” (Leirvik 2004, 233).  
 
In contrast with the tight regulation and control of madrasa education in the Arab Sunni Muslim 
states, madrasa education in Pakistan, as well as in Iran and Irak have retained an important 
degree of independence from the state (Zaman 2002). For instance, in 20th century Iran, as in 
many countries of the Arab Middle East, the state extended control of the religious endowments, 
and the Iranian mullahs lost their administrative power over these sources of income even if 
they continued to finance the ḥawzas. More importantly and specific to many Shi‘i madrasas, 
self-tithing financed the institutions of religious education, which ensured a certain level of 
independence in curricular choices. This contrasts greatly with the domestication of Sunni 
institutions of knowledge in the Arab world such as al-Azhar or the Zaytuna. As a consequence,  
	  Roy Mottahedeh remarked: “In their own view the mullahs of Iran have kept a great tradition of 
learning alive in its pure form; in the view of their Iranian critics they have kept their curriculum 
hermetically sealed against the modern world.” (Mottahedeh 1985: 236) However, even in this 
case, this “hermetic sealing against the modern world” impinged on madrasa education, making 
it a more marked category, socially and politically, leading to the professionalization of religious 
specialists as well as to their politicization, as shown by the role of Khomeiny in the Iranian 
revolution of 1979. (Mottahedeh 1985: 237)  
 
The Islamic Republic reinforced the role of Islamic education at all levels of the schooling 
system, but was not able to enforce control on the great seminary of Qom. However, this control 
was easier to impose on seminaries such as jāmi‘at al-Zahra in Qom, a female ḥawza established 
in 1985 by the Iranian government. Like all other madrasas, the ḥawzas are dependent on the 
historical contingencies of politics. After the Iranian revolution, the Iranian ḥawzas of Qom 
gained more influence and religious authority, while Najaf in Iraq declined due to the repressive 
policy of Saddam Husain. After the American invasion of 2003, the hawzas in Najaf regained 
more intellectual influence. Intellectual debates in the Shi‘i ḥawzas were particularly vigorous 
and creative in the early 21st century, in particular in Qom with the engagement of some of its 
religious authorities with the question of religion and politics, in opposition to Khomeiny’s 
doctrine of the vilayat al-faqih. 
 
 
New Religious Authorities and the Expansion of Islamic Knowledge  
 
The tensions between secular and religious education do not only express themselves at the level 
of state sponsored national educational reforms. They  can also  be found at more diffuse levels,  
as with the attempts that have been made since the 1970s to reverse the encroachment of secular 
knowledge on Islamic knowledge and to remove the dichotomy  between these two domains by 
making all modern academic disciplines “Islamic.” Proponents of the Islamization of knowledge 
do not form a unified organization but rather operate in different countries of the Muslim world 
as well as in Europe and North America, either through universities or NGOs. A first conference 
to sustain the project was organized in Mecca in 1977, followed by other conferences  around the 
Muslim world, and a book series  called “Islamic education Series.”  However, these efforts did 
not form a coherent and unified project, even if they sustained several individual careers (Abaza 
2002). On the other hand, the proliferation of writings on Islam that inundated the book market 
	  in the last part of the 20th century seems to have provided a diversified  new supply of religious 
literature beyond formal curricula. This phenomenon is naturally related to the expansion of 
literacy and of mass education and to the growing access of Muslim populations to the written 
word. The old “yellow literature” (al-kutub al-ṣafrā’) that used to circulate among narrow 
networks of scholars gave way to mass produced books about Islam, from the “pavement 
literature” (Gonzales-Quijano 1998) to more formal bookstores. The proliferation of booklets on 
devotional literature, the easy access to the Koran, as well as to all things “Islamic,” from 
political pamphlets to more classical literature, has sustained the expansion of a public 
immersed in diverse religious narratives.  
 
The effects of the printed religious literature  have been further augmented by the development 
of satellite television programs since the mid 1990s, as well as by the new media, websites in 
particular.  The development of print and new media has radically changed the world of Islamic 
knowledge: religious knowledge circulates more easily, it  can be shared  among large groups, 
and in particular it can easily circumvent the state sponsored religious institutions.  Thus 
religious knowledge can also be individually re appropriated, making it more open, freely used, 
and flexible. It has also become more fragmented, since religious authorities emerge in 
individualized forms.  
 
Dale Eickelman has underlined that massive access to literacy has led to an “objectification” of 
Islam and to new forms of religious authority, that of modern Islamists in particular (Eickelman 
1992b). At the same time, the fragmentation of religious authority has not led to the dilution of 
the social and symbolic capital that Islam has traditionally provided to intellectuals and 
educators (Eickelman 1985 and 1992a). In particular, scholarly religious authorities use new 
media in ways that promote the printed word and their own networks of transmission of ideas, 
often intersecting with the world of politics. Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradhawi, himself an Azharite 
established in Qatar and an opponent of the Mubarak regime, uses the network of Al-Jazeera 
television, as well as his own website, to promote his ideas and books. He has built a large 
international audience and readership. States also promote the scholarly authorities that 
support state-sponsored policies and ideologies. This sponsorship, even when coming from 
authoritarian regimes, is not necessarily an obstacle to publicity and to the building of a large 
readership, (as illustrated by the case of Said Ramadan al-Buti in Syria). This expanding world 
of self-styled religious authorities does not operate in a totally fluid and unconstrained way. 
Political and institutional constraints continue to shape this world, and allow only those who 
	  master them to emerge as recognized authorities. Madrasas reinforce their own transnational 
influences through the new media. It is therefore important to underline that religious curricula 
in schools are only one source of religious instruction, and perhaps not the most important, in  
broader contemporary national and transnational contexts. States are hence pushed not only to 
regulate their own school curricula but also to articulate their own conceptions of Islam with the 
help of individual authorities and of their own religious institutions. In other words, they are 
prompted to operate as religious authorities themselves, in competition with non-state  
authorities, and  they play a role in the “systematization and explicitness of religious tradition” 
(Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 39). 
 
 
Islamic Education’s Reputation After 9/11 
 
A lot of attention has also focused on Islamic education since September 11, 2001, as pundits 
often relate the development of radical forms of Islamism to madrasa indoctrination, in Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan in particular (NPR 2011). In Saudi Arabia,  the public education curriculum 
is heavily devoted to Islam as a living and embodied practice, which also reflects the 
interpretative bent of Wahhabism. Western and Arab media have underlined links between the 
narratives of the Saudi religious curriculum  and the emergence of a radical interpretation of 
Islam. Allegations of such a link led to Saudi projects of revision of the public schools' Islam 
textbooks. The madrasas of Pakistan also came under scrutiny after 2001,  since many of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan had graduated from Deobandi madrasas. However, the interpretations of 
Islam developed in madrasas at the end of the 20th century and in the early 21st century vary 
enormously.  
 
Islamist movements who aim to participate in legal politics and social work have been extremely 
attentive to  education from their inception: for them, education in religious values will lead to 
the emergence of Muslim citizens and of an Islamic society. Their vision of education is 
therefore not only  intended to provide religious instruction so that children  can practice Islam 
properly, but also to  express larger projects of social and political reform, not necessarily of a 
radical sort.  
 
Islamic schools have also been developing in Muslim diasporas in the Western world, as sizable 
Muslim communities have settled there in the second half of the 20th century. Where they have 
	  been authorized, they have usually started as “Sunday schools” in mosques and evolved into full 
fledged schools on the model of the Catholic parish. They offer a mix of secular and religious 
curricula. There are also different models for Islamic higher education in the West. Some 
institutions attempt to recreate traditional forms of religious education based on the teachings 
of the traditional legal schools and the material forms of the ḥalaqa – the Zaytuna institute in 
California, for instance – often to counter forms of instruction that are assumed to sustain 
radical interpretations of Islam, and that do not consider the Islamic tradition in its historical 
and cultural depth. In some countries, where there is mounting opposition to a growing visibility 
of Islamic communities, the establishment of Islamic schools has become a difficult enterprise. 
This is the case in France, where public authorities are reluctant to legalize and sponsor Islamic 
schools as they do for other religious schools (Bowen 2010). As a question for future research, it 
will also be important to evaluate the impact of students migrating within and beyond the 
Muslim world to enroll in Islamic studies on the madrasas and universities themselves. 
 
Islamic education has had an important presence in modern times: it  has taken various forms 
and  has stood in various relations to secular education. It has also become a politicized domain, 
since states see it both as an important stake that impinges on the formation of their citizenry 
and as a political resource that helps them situate their own identity as “Islamic,” for instance in 
the way Islamic law is taught in universities or through religious and civic education in public 
schools. Islamic education is also a much contested domain, in which new actors, political and 
religious, expand their own symbolic and economic capital. Its modern forms are in tremendous 
debt both to the regulating power of the state and to the power of mass education, although 
these two phenomena are often in tension. 
  
 
Summary 
 
• The Islamic tradition gives a central role to knowledge and its dissemination. Since the 
11th century, establishments for the dissemination of knowledge developed, with at their 
center the study of Islamic law and the sciences that it necessitated. Different patterns of 
education developed, and in pre-modern times education was mainly a flexible and 
informal enterprise. 
• In modern times education in the Muslim world has been inhabited by a tension between 
two types of education: the secular and the religious. Competition and mutual influences 
	  have marked the relationship between them. In particular, state led reforms of Islamic 
education have brought religious knowledge in close interaction with secular projects 
and made “Islam” a common object of knowledge for students at all levels. 
• Islamic education in modern history is marked by the impact (or the lack thereof) of the 
political control of the state. Two main patterns have emerged: the madrasas that have 
protected their autonomy from their states and those who have been domesticated by 
state authorities. However, more generally, in both cases, a revitalization of institutions 
of religious knowledge marks the end of the 20th century and the early 21st century, and 
madrasas in the Muslim world have expanded numerically, helping absorb larger cohorts 
of students. 
• The dissemination of secular knowledge, as well as new modes of dissemination such as 
the internet, are transforming the role and influence of madrasas. Migrations from and 
toward the Muslim world are also changing the makeup of the student population in 
Islamic institutions of education. 
• In the end of the 20th century, madrasas have experienced a revitalization process and 
some of them are witnessing important political and intellectual debates that may have 
an impact on politics. The recent re emergence of madrasa as a significant institution 
playing political, educational and moral roles, should lead historians to explore further 
earlier tropes of “decline” and perhaps focus more on processes of reshaping of forms 
and contents of religious education rather than on tropes of decline and resurgence. 
 
 
Discussion Points 
 
• In what sense is knowledge significant in the history of the Islamic civilization? On what 
institutions was the dissemination of knowledge based? 
• How did the religious systems of education transform in modern times? What problems 
did these changes create? 
• How are states implicated in the reforms of religious education? Do religious education 
teachers accept state implication and control? What are the consequences of such a 
control? 
• Under what conditions does religious education produce political radicalization? 
• Does religious education favor socio-economic development? 
 
	   
Further Reading 
 
Doumato, E. and Starrett, G., eds., 2007. Teaching Islam. Textbooks and Religion in the Middle 
East. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
This book examines the content and role of religious textbooks in a diverse sample of Middle 
Eastern countries, including Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.  
 
Heffner R. and Zaman M. Q., eds., 2007. Schooling Islam. The Culture and Politics of Modern 
Muslim Education. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
This collection of essays explores the cultural and political role of Muslim education in the 
Muslim world. It is particularly useful to get a sense of the latest academic debates on the 
subject. 
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